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Justice Scalia’s Originalism and Formalism: 
The Rule of Criminal Law as a Law of Rules
Stephanos Bibas
Far too many reporters and pundits collapse law into politics, assuming that the left–right divide 
between Democratic and Republican appointees 
neatly explains politically liberal versus politically 
conservative outcomes at the Supreme Court. the 
late Justice Antonin Scalia defied such caricatures.
Justice Scalia was a jurist through and through, 
not a politician, and for the most part practiced 
what he preached. His consistent judicial philoso-
phy made him the leading exponent of originalism, 
textualism, and formalism in American law, and 
over the course of his three decades on the Court, 
he changed the terms of judicial debate. Now, as a 
result, supporters and critics alike start with the 
plain meaning of the statutory or constitutional 
text rather than loose appeals to legislative history 
or policy.
Justice Scalia’s approach was perhaps most strik-
ing and counterintuitive in criminal law and pro-
cedure. He was known to confess that as a policy 
matter, he favored vigorous law enforcement and 
punishment, but as a jurist, he championed a prin-
cipled understanding of the rule of law. His approach 
helped to preserve individual liberty, make the law 
clearer and more consistent and transparent, give 
citizens better notice, promote democratic account-
ability, and check prosecutors’ and judges’ power.
Sometimes, his principles led to politically con-
servative results, as with Eighth Amendment limits 
on punishments; in other areas, such as the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation and Jury trial Clauses, 
he was criminal defendants’ best friend. Whatever 
the outcome, Justice Scalia strove to follow his prin-
ciples, and in doing so, he promoted important val-
ues of the rule of law.
A Consistent Methodology
the first thing to note about Justice Scalia’s 
methodology is that he had one. Many jurists drift 
along, cobbling together a congeries of decisions 
without articulating how one decides. Justice Scalia, 
by contrast, was famed as the leading proponent of 
originalism and formalism.
Justice Scalia championed the Constitu-
tion’s original understanding. Before him, many 
originalists seemed to focus on the Framers’ sub-
jective intent, a hazardous inquiry given the paucity 
of sources and the difficulty of separating sincerity 
from propaganda.
Rather than plumbing the Framers’ minds, Jus-
tice Scalia took an objective approach. He asked 
what the words of the text meant at the time they 
were enacted. thus, his originalism was a species of 
textualism.1 In the Scalia era, litigators learned to 
put less emphasis on legislative history and more on 
the words of the Constitution or statute itself, sup-
plemented by dictionary definitions and the like.
Rather than plumbing the Framers’ 
minds, Justice Scalia asked what the 
words of the text meant at the time 
they were enacted. In the Scalia era, 
litigators learned to put less emphasis 
on legislative history and more on 
the words of the Constitution or 
statute itself.
Objective-meaning originalism, he emphasized, 
respects the democratic decisions of those who 
voted to enact the text. Moreover, it preserves the 
separation of powers, a value often overlooked in the 
criminal law.2
Originalism safeguards the Framers’ and legis-
lature’s prerogative to make and amend laws. It also 
protects the right to a jury, the “spinal column of 
American democracy”—the only right that appears 
in both the body of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights.3 the Bill of Rights is replete with jury pro-
tections, including the Fifth Amendment’s grand 
Jury Clause, the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of 
criminal petit juries, and the Seventh Amendment’s 
guarantee of civil petit juries.
the Framers valued juries as essential checks on 
all three branches of government. Legislatures pass 
overly broad criminal statutes, which may sweep in 
morally faultless conduct and sympathetic defen-
dants, but juries apply them to the facts. Overzeal-
ous prosecutors must persuade both a grand and a 
petit jury to charge and convict felony defendants, 
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and judges can neither override juries’ decisions to 
acquit nor authorize retrial after an acquittal. the 
lay, popular voice of jurors is supposed to be a coun-
terweight to our increasingly professionalized crim-
inal justice system.
Most often, Justice Scalia’s originalism went 
hand in hand with his formalism. As he famously 
put it, “Long live formalism. It is what makes a gov-
ernment a government of laws and not of men.”4 
thus, his famous essay praised “the rule of law as a 
law of rules.”5 Rules help to constrain judicial discre-
tion, preserve space for democratic branches, and 
increase predictability. those benefits, in his view, 
more than outweigh the costs of over- and underin-
clusive rules as well as rigidity. Of course laws need 
to be updated from time to time, but that is a job for 
legislatures, not courts.
Newspaper reporters who saw the Supreme Court 
of the united States as a political horse race often 
contrasted Justice Scalia with his supposed political 
opposite, Justice John Paul Stevens. But in criminal 
law and procedure, those two justices agreed sur-
prisingly often. Justice Scalia’s true foil was, rather, 
Justice Stephen Breyer.
Justice Breyer looked to the future; Justice Sca-
lia, to the past. Justice Breyer inquired about wise 
policy and legislative history; Justice Scalia stuck 
to the text. Justice Breyer trusted technocratic 
experts; Justice Scalia, democracy. Justice Breyer 
prized efficiency, but Justice Scalia subordinat-
ed efficiency to liberty.6 And while Justice Brey-
er emphasized judicial flexibility, Justice Scalia 
sought to protect juries. As Justice Scalia put it, the 
jury trial “has never been efficient; but it has always 
been free.”7 the two justices’ approaches could not 
have been more different.
Criminal Procedure and the Constitution
The Confrontation Clause. Justice Scalia’s con-
tributions are clearest in his approach to two provi-
sions of the Sixth Amendment. For one, he rescued 
the Confrontation Clause from near-oblivion.
For decades, courts had conflated and confound-
ed the constitutional right to confront one’s accus-
ers with the nonconstitutional hearsay doctrines 
in the law of evidence that grew up well after the 
Founding. In 1980, the Supreme Court had inter-
preted the clause as establishing only a presump-
tion in favor of live testimony. Out-of-court evidence 
was nevertheless admissible if it fell within a “firmly 
rooted hearsay exception” or bore “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.”8 those mushy stan-
dards suggested multifactor balancing tests that led 
to inconsistent and unpredictable results.
that approach had drifted far from the text 
and historical understanding of the Sixth Amend-
ment. the text calls for a rule, not a standard: “In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right…to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him….”9 that language says nothing about a mere 
presumption, nor about hearsay. Nor does it entrust 
judges with gauging substantive reliability. Rather, 
it requires them to ensure a particular procedure—
“confront[ation] with the witnesses against him”—
so that juries can weigh reliability for themselves.
the historical understanding of the confronta-
tion guarantee underscored the textual guarantee. 
the English common-law tradition had long relied 
on adversarial testing and cross-examining live 
witnesses in open court, unlike the introduction of 
pretrial questioning by inquisitorial systems. In the 
notorious English treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 
however, the prosecution had introduced a letter 
and an unsworn out-of-court statement by Raleigh’s 
alleged accomplice and refused to bring the accusers 
into court for cross-examination. In reaction to this 
and similar abuses, English and then American law 
excluded ex parte written evidence and required live 
cross-examination to ensure truth. thus, the Con-
frontation Clause’s core purpose was to prevent the 
use of ex parte written examinations as a substitute 
for live testimony in open court.10
For years, several justices including Justice Sca-
lia had written separately, seeking to reinvigorate 
the Confrontation Clause.11 In 2004, in Crawford 
v. Washington, he succeeded. Writing for a seven-
Justice majority, Justice Scalia replaced the hearsay 
balancing test with a bright-line rule: A witness is 
one who gives testimony, not just anything that falls 
within the jumbled hearsay rule, and testimony is 
a formal statement to government officers made in 
order to prove a fact.12 Confrontation requires an 
opportunity to question a witness and challenge his 
account face-to-face.
No test is self-defining, and further cases had 
to spell out the contours of these terms. As Justice 
Scalia later wrote for a nearly unanimous Court, a 
domestic-abuse victim’s statement to a police offi-
cer after a domestic-abuse incident has ended qual-
ifies as testimony, but a 911 call right after such an 
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incident does not; the former was made primarily to 
facilitate investigating crime, while the latter was 
primarily a cry for help.13
Some of these line-drawing questions have been 
controversial. Even if a declarant is unavailable for 
cross-examination because the defendant allegedly 
killed her, according to Justice Scalia’s opinion for the 
Court, the defendant has not forfeited his confronta-
tion right by his own wrongdoing unless he killed her 
in order to prevent her from testifying.14 And in some, 
the Court has narrowed the confrontation right over 
Justice Scalia’s dissent. Most notably, the Court, over 
Justice Scalia’s dissent, has been willing to find that 
a dying gunshot victim’s statements to police were 
made not primarily to ensure the shooter’s arrest and 
conviction, but to address the ongoing threat to public 
safety posed by a shooter on the loose.15
Perhaps the most questionable aspect of the Craw-
ford doctrine is its expansion to forensic and scien-
tific tests. Laboratory analysis is a far cry from the 
unsworn letter and out-of-court interrogation that 
Sir Walter Raleigh sought to confront. It is not always 
clear who is the relevant witness, nor what laboratory 
protocols, experts, and equipment a defendant needs 
access to in order to challenge a machine readout.16 
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 
extended Crawford to require live testimony, not just 
sworn lab reports, by the lab analyst who tests drugs. 
the defendant’s ability to subpoena the witness if 
desired, the Court held, is no substitute.17
Justice Scalia has left an enduring 
legacy and changed the terms of 
debate. He has renewed focus on the 
Constitution’s text, structure, and 
history, which prize an adversarial, 
oral approach to criminal justice in 
open court.
At its best, the Crawford line of cases united a 
coalition of liberal as well as conservative justices, 
both formalists and those concerned more pragmat-
ically with the unfairness of introducing unchal-
lenged testimony. But the further the facts are from 
a classic out-of-court deposition, sworn statement, 
or police interrogation, the weaker the consensus is. 
the lab analyst cases, in particular, have fractured 
the Court. Four justices, led by Justice Scalia, sup-
ported or leaned toward applying Crawford broadly 
to forensic evidence. Four justices disagreed. Oddly 
enough, the swing justice in these cases has been 
Justice Clarence thomas, who alone among his 
colleagues treats formal, sworn laboratory certifi-
cates as testimony in violation of Crawford, but not 
unsworn lab reports.18
On other Confrontation Clause issues, Justice 
Scalia likewise sometimes succeeded (and some-
times did not) in bringing along a majority of the 
Court. He wrote for a majority that shielding child 
witnesses from seeing a defendant violated the 
defendant’s right to confront his accusers.19 Soon 
thereafter, however, a majority of the Court, over 
Justice Scalia’s dissent, upheld a child-abuse vic-
tim’s testifying via one-way closed-circuit television 
instead of in the defendant’s physical presence.20 
the majority stressed the vital need to protect child-
abuse victims from further trauma; Justice Scalia’s 
dissent emphasized the text’s bright-line rule.
Justice Scalia did not always succeed in persuad-
ing the Court to apply these new rules as he would 
have liked. He has reproached the Court not only for 
promulgating vague, unpredictable legal standards 
(like the pre-Crawford standard), but also for apply-
ing ostensibly clear rules (like Crawford or face-to-
face testimony) in strained, fact-specific, or unpre-
dictable ways. Over his dissents, some of the Court’s 
decisions have swung back toward looking at more 
factors, such as the presence of a gun, the evidence 
of an ongoing emergency, other indicia of reliability, 
and harms to children. Justice thomas’s insistence 
that testimony be formal has limited the breadth of 
Crawford’s reach. In addition, Justice Scalia argu-
ably overreached in extending the Confrontation 
Clause woodenly to forensic analysts, where there 
is little text or history to illuminate what confronta-
tion is required.
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia has left an endur-
ing legacy and changed the terms of debate. He has 
renewed focus on the Constitution’s text, struc-
ture, and history, which prize an adversarial, oral 
approach to criminal justice in open court, although 
there remain plenty of questions about how anal-
ogous 18th century abuses are to 21st centu-
ry technologies.
The Jury Trial Clause. Justice Scalia also 
spearheaded the revival of another clause of the 
Sixth Amendment: the Jury trial Clause.
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throughout most of the 19th and 20th centu-
ries, judges dominated criminal sentencing, finding 
facts and imposing sentences within broad ranges 
with little if any role for juries. the Court repeat-
edly blessed this judicial free hand, largely unfet-
tered by procedural rules, even when a judicial find-
ing triggered a mandatory minimum sentence.21 the 
Court refused to lay down any rule specifying what 
facts must be elements of crimes to be proved to a 
jury, offering only the most impressionistic, offhand 
remark in McMillan v. Pennsylvania: “the statute 
gives no impression of having been tailored to per-
mit the [sentence-enhancement] finding to be a tail 
which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”22
The Court’s casual, pragmatic 
dismissal of a Sixth Amendment 
challenge in McMillan v. Pennsylvania 
conflicted both with Justice Scalia’s 
concern for the text and with his 
insistence upon meaningful, firm rules.
the Court’s casual, pragmatic dismissal of a Sixth 
Amendment challenge conflicted both with Justice 
Scalia’s concern for the text and with his insistence 
upon meaningful, firm rules. In a seemingly minor 
immigration-crime case, Justice Scalia revived the 
issue in a dissent, strongly suggesting (and later argu-
ing) that any fact that increases a maximum sentence 
must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.23 
Within a few years, he succeeded in persuading Jus-
tice thomas, converting his dissenting suggestion 
into law.
 n Apprendi v. New Jersey held that prosecutors must 
prove any fact (other than a prior conviction) that 
increases a statutory maximum sentence to a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.24
 n Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Blakely v. 
Washington applied the same rule to sentencing 
guidelines, invalidating binding guidelines trig-
gered by judicial fact-finding.25
 n Soon after, the Court extended Blakely’s logic 
to invalidate the u.S. Sentencing guidelines’ 
binding force, rendering them advisory because 
judges cannot find facts that trigger mandatory 
enhancements.26
 n the Court also applied Apprendi’s logic to require 
juries, not judges, to find facts needed to make 
defendants eligible for the death penalty.27
In this line of cases, formalism triumphed over 
loosey-goosey functionalism. Justice Scalia’s Blake-
ly majority opinion forcefully criticized the “obvi-
ous” “subjectivity” of McMillan’s tail-wags-the-dog 
standard. the standard was so murky that people 
could always disagree about whether an enhance-
ment went “too far” and never prove otherwise.28 
With mordant humor, the justice mocked the canine 
standard that would:
require that the ratio of sentencing-factor add-
on to basic criminal sentence be no greater than 
the ratio of caudal vertebrae to body in the breed 
of canine with the longest tail. Or perhaps no 
greater than the average such ratio for all breeds. 
Or perhaps the median. Regrettably, Apprendi 
has prevented full development of this line of 
jurisprudence.29
Justice Scalia’s barbs made reading footnotes fun.
Interestingly, the Court later extended Apprendi’s 
logic even further than Justice Scalia was willing to 
go. Justice Scalia repeatedly voted to allow judges to 
find facts that trigger mandatory minimum sentenc-
es within an authorized sentencing range, because 
minimums do not exceed the range authorized by 
the jury.30 the Court eventually went further, hold-
ing that juries must find any fact that raises a mini-
mum or maximum sentence.31
As with Crawford, in the Apprendi/Blakely line 
of cases, Justice Scalia assembled a coalition of 
more liberal Justices Stevens, David Souter, and 
Ruth Bader ginsburg together with fellow original-
ist conservative Justice thomas. the divide on the 
Court was not between left and right as convention-
ally understood, but between the formalists (Jus-
tices Stevens, Souter, ginsburg, Scalia, and thom-
as, and later Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena 
Kagan) and the pragmatists (Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony 
Kennedy, and Breyer, and later Justice Samuel Alito 
and sometimes Chief Justice John Roberts).
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And as with Crawford, that coalition did not always 
hold fast. though five justices in Booker found that the 
u.S. Sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amend-
ment, Justice ginsburg switched sides on the remedi-
al question. thus, instead of insisting that juries find 
guidelines-enhancement facts, the Booker remedial 
opinion invalidated the guidelines’ binding force and 
left judges in charge of applying the now-advisory 
guidelines. the irony is that the Sixth Amendment 
jury-trial guarantee produced not a clear rule operat-
ed by juries, but a fuzzier standard that entrusts more 
power and discretion to judges.
the Apprendi/Blakely line of cases landed an 
important symbolic blow for juries, underscoring 
their constitutional role, but well over a decade later, 
the impact of this doctrine remains unclear. Juries 
are still an endangered species, as plea bargaining 
remains rampant and resolves 19 out of 20 cases. Sen-
tencing guidelines still leave judges with lots of power 
that is hidden from view and unchecked by juries. 
Justice Scalia would have dynamited the entire edi-
fice of the u.S. Sentencing Commission as violating 
the separation of powers, but his lonely dissent to that 
effect drew no other takers.32 As with Crawford, prob-
lems persist in applying an 18th century right to novel 
and unanticipated 21st century realities.
The Fourth Amendment
Justice Scalia also surprised many observers 
in his somewhat civil-libertarian approach to the 
Fourth Amendment. On certain issues, he advocated 
clear rules that favored law enforcement, such as the 
objective (rather than subjective) test for the reason-
ableness of a stop.33 When it came to defining search-
es and reasonableness, however, his originalism and 
formalism led him to support rules that very often 
favored criminal suspects.
take the issue of what qualifies as a search in the 
first place. When an object is in plain view of police 
who are already lawfully present there, they may 
seize it without a warrant. Many justices were will-
ing to extend the plain-view doctrine to allow a trivial 
additional intrusion by police, but not Justice Scalia. 
Writing for the Court in Arizona v. Hicks, he held that 
police may not move a stereo turntable even a few 
inches to view and record its serial number without 
first getting a warrant supported by probable cause.34
unlike many other conservative members of the 
Court, Justice Scalia was also willing to recognize a 
variety of intrusions, new and old, as searches.
 n His opinion for the Court in Kyllo v. United States 
held that pointing a thermal-imaging device at a 
house to detect heat emanating from it counts as 
a search;35
 n Likewise, in Florida v. Jardines, he wrote for the 
Court in holding that a trained drug-sniffing 
dog’s sniffing of a suspect’s front porch and front 
door constituted a search and required a war-
rant;36 and
 n His opinion for a majority of the Court in United 
States v. Jones held that attaching a gPS tracking 
device to a suspect’s car and tracking his move-
ments qualified as a search.37
In all three of these cases, he rejected the amor-
phous, unpredictable reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test in favor of bright-line rules rooted in 
the common law of trespass upon an owner’s prop-
erty rights.
Justice Scalia was also far more willing than 
many other justices to clearly demarcate searches 
that were categorically unreasonable. While he was 
willing to allow drug testing based on individualized 
suspicion, he dissented from allowing suspicionless 
searches,38 and in dissent in Maryland v. King, he 
argued that routine, suspicionless cheek swabs of 
arrestees to collect their DNA were unreasonable 
searches: “the Fourth Amendment forbids search-
ing a person for evidence of a crime when there is no 
basis for believing the person is guilty of the crime or 
is in possession of incriminating evidence. that pro-
hibition is categorical and without exception; it lies 
at the very heart of the Fourth Amendment.”39 As he 
memorably put it, “I doubt that the proud men who 
wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so 
eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.”40
Justice Scalia enforced the Fourth 
Amendment vigorously, starting from 
common-law baselines.
In that vein, the justice was the key fifth vote in Ari-
zona v. Gant to limit searches of cars incident to arrest. 
Such searches can include looking for weapons or all 
destructible evidence only if the area is still within 
the suspect’s reach. Once the suspect is handcuffed 
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and away from the car, police may search the car only 
for evidence of the crime of arrest. So when a suspect 
has been arrested for driving with a suspended license 
and handcuffed in the back of a patrol car, police may 
not then rummage around the car in search of drugs 
or the like. the Court drew this test from one of Jus-
tice Scalia’s earlier concurrences.41
Justice Scalia enforced the Fourth Amendment 
vigorously, starting from common-law baselines. 
that led him to reject subjective privacy tests in favor 
of those that are grounded in trespass and property 
law. As to vehicle searches, he acknowledged that 
“the historical practices the Framers sought to pre-
serve” were unclear, so he relied upon “traditional 
standards of reasonableness.”42
the justice was quite right that common law and 
history can often provide clearer baselines than cir-
cular reasoning about expectations of privacy, but 
as Justice Alito has observed, these historical sourc-
es cannot provide definitive verdicts on 21st centu-
ry technological searches, such as DNA analysis or 
assembling a mosaic of data points from long-term 
gPS tracking.43 Justice Scalia did not have all the 
answers, but at least he began with the right questions.
The Eighth Amendment
Justice Scalia consistently opposed extending 
the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and unusual Pun-
ishment Clause to forbid capital punishment. the 
Constitution expressly references the long-settled 
practice of capital punishment, and judges may not 
use evolving standards of decency to trump the tex-
tual and historical warrant for the death penalty. 
“[P]assionate and deeply held” views opposing capi-
tal punishment, he wrote, are “no excuse for read-
ing them into a Constitution that does not contain 
them,” particularly since doing so would “thrust a 
minority’s views upon the people.”44 In that vein, 
he dissented from the Court’s holdings that a state 
may not execute a defendant for the crime of rap-
ing a child and that it may not execute defendants 
who are mentally retarded or were under 18 years 
of age.45
Justice Scalia also opposed much of the Court’s 
intricate regulation of capital sentencing proce-
dures. In particular, he rejected the Woodson/Lock-
ett/Eddings doctrine requiring unfettered admis-
sion of all mitigating evidence in capital sentencing 
as being starkly at odds with the requirement of rules 
to channel and guide the capital sentencing process. 
“to acknowledge that ‘there perhaps is an inherent 
tension’ between [the two] line[s] of cases,” he wrote 
in Walton v. Arizona, “is rather like saying that there 
was perhaps an inherent tension between the Allies 
and the Axis Powers in World War II.”46 that posi-
tion was not only formalist in embracing rules over 
unfettered discretion, but also originalist in sup-
porting a textually and historically approved pun-
ishment that used to be prescribed for many cases.
Justice Scalia’s position in Walton 
v. Arizona was not only formalist in 
embracing rules over unfettered 
discretion, but also originalist in 
supporting a textually and historically 
approved punishment that used to be 
prescribed for many cases.
the justice likewise opposed invalidating various 
noncapital sentences as cruel and unusual, though 
he could not persuade a majority of his colleagues 
to agree. He advanced a series of textual and histori-
cal arguments to show that the clause forbids only 
certain modes of punishment and legally unauthor-
ized punishments, not disproportionality between 
a particular crime and its particular punishment.47 
(While that position is a reasonable one, recent origi-
nalist scholarship has argued powerfully for reading 
the clause to require retributive proportionality.48) 
He also joined in dissenting from recent decisions 
that restricted sentences of life imprisonment with-
out parole for juvenile defendants.49
Substantive Criminal Law
Justice Scalia’s insistence on clear rules informed 
his reading of substantive criminal statutes, often 
in ways that benefitted defendants. the justice was 
famous for vigorously advancing the rule of lenity as a 
corollary of his textualism. If a legislature unambigu-
ously criminalizes conduct, it gives potential violators 
clear notice and fair warning;50 if it does not, prosecu-
tors and judges may not take it upon themselves to 
stretch wording to cover borderline criminal conduct.
there certainly is room to question Justice Sca-
lia’s emphasis on notice, which, as he admitted, is nec-
essarily a fiction in practice: Few if any prospective 
thieves or tax evaders spend their spare time reading 
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statute books. But lenity gives legislatures a clear 
background rule against which they can legislate and 
requires the democratic process to authorize crimi-
nal punishment and stigma.51 If legislatures dislike 
restrained readings of criminal statutes, they remain 
free to amend them to make them broader and clearer.
The frequency with which Justice 
Scalia applied the rule of lenity 
underscored his willingness to follow 
his principled methodology even 
where it produced results he might not 
personally like.
the justice voted to apply lenity to a wide range of 
crimes, from money laundering to carjacking to tax 
evasion,52 and in doing so, he focused solely on wheth-
er the text was clear, without recourse to legislative 
history.53 He did sometimes find statutory text clear 
enough to preclude recourse to lenity, even where 
other justices disagreed,54 but the frequency with 
which he applied the rule of lenity underscored his 
willingness to follow his principled methodology even 
where it produced results he might not personally like.
Justice Scalia’s emphasis on clear rules, notice, 
and fair warning also led him to strike down laws 
that were simply too vague to salvage. He advocated 
invalidating the residual clause of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act as violating the due process require-
ment of fair notice. After advancing this position 
in repeated dissents for years, he ultimately won 
a majority of the Court over to his side last year, 
writing for the Court in striking down the residual 
clause.55 He also would have gone further than the 
Court did to rein in honest-services fraud. While the 
majority of the Court limited that statute to bribery 
and kickbacks, Justice Scalia would have invalidat-
ed the entire provision as too vague to salvage and 
beyond the power of judges to rewrite.56
Conclusion
In short, Justice Scalia defied simplistic ideo-
logical labels. In doing so, he underscored one of his 
favorite themes: that law is (or at least should be) 
much more than politics. His methodologically con-
servative embrace of formalism, clarity, rules, and 
especially textualism and originalism often put him 
on the side of criminal defendants, even though his 
personal sympathies were pro-prosecution.
Often, he could not persuade a majority of his col-
leagues to follow his originalist principles to his logi-
cal conclusion.
 n He was no fan of the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule, but the most he could do was to dis-
suade his colleagues from expanding it by bal-
ancing the rule’s speculative deterrent benefits 
against its concrete costs.57
 n In a trio of cases, Justice Scalia dissented from 
extending the right to effective assistance of 
counsel to plea bargaining, as doing so “embrac-
es the sporting-chance theory of criminal law, in 
which the State functions like a conscientious 
casino operator, giving each player a fair chance 
to beat the house, that is, to serve less time than 
the law says he deserves.”58
 n In dissent, he criticized Miranda as “a milestone 
of judicial overreaching” and the Court’s reaf-
firmation of it as “the very Cheops’ Pyramid (or 
perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue) 
of judicial arrogance.”59
He had a rhetorical gift for sharpening the nub 
of almost any issue, piercing the prosy fog of the u.S. 
Reports.
One can certainly raise legitimate questions about 
how far to take Justice Scalia’s approach. Elsewhere, 
I have given him two cheers, not three, criticizing his 
formalism as sometimes too rigid and impractical 
and his originalism as stretching beyond its textual 
and historical foundations.60 Many of the Framers’ 
18th century criminal procedural rules have no clear 
answers for 21st century problems: think of scien-
tific and forensic experts, high-tech searches, elec-
tronic privacy, or a plea-bargaining assembly line 
that the Court is unwilling to dynamite.
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia’s animating con-
cerns will remain enduring touchstones of our law: 
the importance of protecting the roles of legislatures, 
juries, and the people; ensuring fair notice; and pre-
serving liberty by limiting judicial discretion and 
prosecutorial power. His criminal jurisprudence is 
thus a microcosm of a principled judicial approach 
to law more generally, and he will be greatly missed.
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